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Abstract: There has been a significant increase in the proliferation and implementation of Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) in different disciplines, including the monitoring of maritime environments,
healthcare systems, and industrial sectors. It has now become critical to address the security issues of
data communication while considering sensor node constraints. There are many proposed schemes,
including the scheme being proposed in this paper, to ensure that there is a high level of security
in WSNs. This paper presents a symmetric security scheme for a maritime coastal environment
monitoring WSN. The scheme provides security for travelling packets via individually encrypted
links between authenticated neighbors, thus avoiding a reiteration of a global rekeying process.
Furthermore, this scheme proposes a dynamic update key based on a trusted node configuration,
called a leader node, which works as a trusted third party. The technique has been implemented in
real time on a Waspmote test bed sensor platform and the results from both field testing and indoor
bench testing environments are discussed in this paper.
Keywords: wireless sensor networks; WSN; security; maritime WSN; dynamic symmetric key update;
Waspmote; algorithm
1. Introduction
Recent advances in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have meant that sensor nodes are capable
of processing and transmitting environmental monitored data in real time to end users who are located
far from the area covered by the sensor network. WSNs are still limited however in terms of energy,
memory storage, and security communication capabilities. Fortunately, security for WSNs has been
examined and developed upon for different application domains, such as medical and environmental.
It has been shown by Mathur et al. in [1] that it is possible to provide a patient monitoring system that
resolves security issues associated with data loss, while in [2] Elgenaidi et al. have studied different
water environment monitoring systems based on WSNs that carry information that has value, and this
value (data) must be encrypted for protection. The security of transmitted data is crucial in WSN
applications so as not to reveal to unauthorized persons the information travelling between nodes,
however this security solution must be resource-friendly and efficient. In order to build an efficient
security algorithm, it is necessary to fully understand the process of security functions in terms of
energy consumption, time execution and code size.
In WSN mesh networks, symmetric encryption algorithms have been widely used because
of the advantages of low cost with respect to power consumption, time execution and code size.
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The main obstruction in the implementation of symmetric encryption is the issue of key re-distribution
between nodes in the case of a change in the network members. Asymmetric encryption techniques,
such as Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) have been used
to tackle re-keying in WSNs applications [3], however, the problem with using these techniques is
the computation overhead on every node in the network, and this increases the cost of each node
and accordingly the processing of security key management. Generally, key management in sensor
networks can be listed under three headings:
• Key Transport/Distribution where one sensor node creates and securely transfers it to the others.
• Key Agreement where the key is established by a shared secret between two or more nodes.
• Key pre-distribution where keys are distributed before the sensor nodes are deployed.
Moreover, key management can be performed using trusted third party devices such as trusted
servers, authentication servers, key distribution centers (KDCs) key translation centers (KTCs),
and certification authorities (CAs) [4–6].
Some applications rely upon a secure key establishment mechanism where each node in a key
establishment protocol is able to determine the true identity of the other nodes that could possibly gain
access to the resulting key. This implies the preclusion of any unauthorized additional parties from
deducing the same key [5]. Many secure key management schemes which promote longer battery life
also depend on the type of system.
The most widely used wireless standard for WSNs is IEEE 802.15.4 [7]. The main advantages
of using IEEE 802.15.4 are very low energy consumption, the capability of using different network
topologies, for instance point-to-point topology the capability of inter-operability with transmit/receive
chips, such as XBee 802.15.4 pro and the ability to engage with Wi-Fi.
The scheme being proposed in this paper addresses the main issues in security mechanisms
based on the symmetric encryption algorithm, including memory, storage space, key generation,
and re-keying. In this paper, the deployment of a Waspmote sensor node integrated with the XBee
802.15.4 pro module in an outdoor environment using IEEE 802.15.4/2.4 GHz standard will be used
to demonstrate the implementation of the proposed protocol. Most of the presented results to date
by other authors [8,9] have been obtained using simulators and not real deployments as in this paper.
This paper also presents a security mechanism suitable for marine coastal monitoring, where each
node in a line topology sends packets encrypted with its secret key, called the Adjacent key, to provide
data confidentiality. This key is shared only with an authorized neighbor in the network. Furthermore,
the re-keying phase in the revocation process will be a partly operation coordinated by a node called
the leader node.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: related works are discussed in Section 2. In Section 3
the proposed technique is discussed covering network topology, platform, travelling packets, packet
structure, and security and key management. It also describes transmission security and data
encryption, Re-keying and the memory requirement for the scheme. In Section 4, the outdoor
implementation and performance measurements of the scheme are also presented in different scenarios.
These measurements are discussed in terms of the received single strength indicator (RSSI), the average
round trip time (RTT) and current consumption. In Section 5 a discussion and comparison between
measurements of the proposed scheme and results of other schemes is given. The paper is concluded
in Section 6.
2. Related Work
There are some well-known practices for developing efficient trust security systems for WSNs
and managing the cryptographic keys in order to protect WSNs from malicious attacks [10]. Liu, et al.
proposed in [11] an efficient and simple technique for detecting selective forwarding attacks and
recovering the failed route based on a per-hop acknowledgement. This section will present key
management and encryption schemes, which ensure the level of security in WSNs application.
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Liebeherr et al. [12] designed and implemented a security key management and encryption
scheme called the ‘neighborhood key’ scheme. This technique provided integrity and confidentiality for
application data in overlay networks. The core mechanism of this technique was to avoid network-wide
re-keying operations. Additionally, the scheme re-encrypts the payload data at each forwarding hop.
Moreover, the neighborhood key method provided a solution for protection against routing attacks,
where authentication between sensor nodes in the network depends on the certificate signed by a
trusted third party using an X.509 Version 3 certificate. Each sensor node in the network had its own
signed certificate, also each node stores the certificates of one or more trusted third party. In this
scheme the authentication phase was performed without coordination with other nodes. The node
certificate included a secret key, which is used to encrypt or sign data. Sensor nodes exchange
certificates after receiving a message protocol from another node in the network. Once the certificates
are exchanged, the encryption of data and the signing of hashes in each node will be done with a single
symmetric key called a ‘neighborhood key’. Thus, the neighborhood keys are shared between current
authenticated neighbors in the network. In the joining phase where a new node joins the network,
a new neighborhood key must be generated and sent to all of its authenticated neighbors in order to
maintain confidentiality in the network.
Furthermore, updating and exchanging a new neighborhood key is executed whenever the set of
authenticated neighbors are changed or the specified maximum lifetime of the current neighborhood
key is expired. Therefore, every sensor node must encrypt the new neighborhood key with the
public keys of all the authenticated neighbors (using the RSA algorithm), which are stored in
the node during the authentication stage. The security issues are exacerbated during failures in
re-establishment of the network topology when one or more nodes join/leave the network at the
same time. Additionally, by implementing an integrity test and limiting the allowed frequency of
transmitted key request messages the neighborhood scheme protects nodes from Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks from malicious adversaries.
A hierarchical key management scheme for secure group communications in a mobile ad hoc
network is proposed by Wang et al. [13] and Annadurai [14]. In this proposed scheme, a new approach
with a two-layer structure where a cluster head manages information between sensor nodes in the
layers was given. The main idea in this scheme is that nodes are divided into two subgroup levels,
a Level 1 subgroup ‘L1-subgroup’ contains all sensor nodes in the subgroup. Moreover, Level 2
subgroup ‘L2-subgroup’ is located depending on positional information of nodes in Level 1. In order to
manage data transmission and coordinate security keys between nodes in the same subgroup level and
with nodes in the other subgroup level, an election of a cluster head in each level must be processed.
Generally, the election of a cluster head in each level depends on the largest weight value of nodes [4].
In each L1-subgroup’, the node with the largest weight value in every L1-subgroup will be selected
as the level 1 cluster head ‘L1-head’. Then to manage communication between levels and subgroups,
the largest node weight value in L2-subgroup will be selected as Level 2 cluster head ‘L2-head’.
The nodes in the subgroups use the Diffie–Hellman (DH) scheme for secure transmission of their
own subgroup keys, where each subgroup has a unique subgroup key [13,14]. Packets are transmitted
between subgroups through the cluster heads. The L1-head generates a communication key which is
shared between the different subgroups. However, the encryption and decryption operation during
data transmission in different subgroups is only through subgroup keys. Furthermore, the Level 2
cluster head, ‘L2-head’, is responsible for a new node joining its subgroup.
Jang et al. [15] proposed a time-based management protocol for WSNs to establish pair-wise keys.
This technique relies on probabilistic time intervals and multiple initial keys, KI. In this scheme, a pool
of initial keys is assigned to time slots during the key setup phase. Sensor nodes are preloaded with
initial key and master keys of randomly chosen time slots before the deployment phase. In the initial
key establishment phase, all sensor nodes that contain KI can compute a master key and then establish
pair-wise keys with their neighbor node that was deployed at the same time slot using the same initial
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key. However, sensor nodes that were deployed at different time slots can establish pair-wise keys,
if they have the same master key derived from the current initial key.
3. Proposed Scheme
Node configuration and security key management are fundamental characteristics to improve the
performance of secure data transmission in a WSN. These security considerations require practical
and accurate key management techniques. Location-based techniques solve the topology construction
issues, where every node in a network knows its own position in the network. Furthermore,
neighbor-based techniques make WSNs efficient in terms of packet travelling, power consumption
and topology control.
3.1. Network Topology
In most WSNs, a node needs to know some very important features, such as its own location and
that of the destination node. Normally, nodes in WSNs use a location service mechanism such as the
Global Positioning System (GPS) to perform the routing function [16]. In this section, an approach
to manage and maintain a line topology network that is appropriate for coastal marine applications
based on WSNs is presented. The scheme addresses some of the obstacles to security in WSNs,
such as memory storage, communication overhead, energy consumption and the re-keying process.
This mechanism relies upon the concepts of location-based routing [17]. Packets travel between
nodes based on the information of the next repeater node. Subsequently, the static position of the
sensor node encourages proposing a strategy for managing and controlling the transmission of secure
packets between wireless nodes. In addition, maintaining network connectivity when removing or
joining nodes makes it necessary to know the identification of the neighboring node/nodes in order to
exchange the cryptographic keys and create a secure communication link. The main idea behind this
work is to allow an ordinary node to determine its authenticated neighbor without the use of complex
computations. Nodes will make their decision depending on the recommendation message from the
node called the leader node (Ln). The Ln is located at a calculated distance from the line topology of
ordinary nodes. Figure 1 illustrates the deployment of the nodes in our scheme and Table 1 provides
details on the notation used.
Sensors 2016, 16, 2204 4 of 19 
 
3. Proposed Scheme  
Node configuration and security key management are fundamental characteristics to improve 
the performance of secure data trans ission in a WSN. These se urity considerations r quire 
p actic l and accurate key manageme t techniques. Location-based techniques solve the topology 
constr ction issues, where every node in a network knows it  wn position in the netw rk. 
F rthermo , neighbor-based techniques make WSNs efficien  in terms of packet travelling, p wer 
consumption and topology control. 
3.1. Network Topology 
In most WSNs, a node needs to know some very important features, such as its own location 
and that of the destination node. Normally, nodes in WSNs use a location service mechanism such as 
the Global Positioning System (GPS) to perform the routing function [16]. In this section, an approach 
to manage and maintain a line topology network that is appropriate for coastal marine applications 
based on WSNs is presented. The scheme addresses some of the obstacles to security in WSNs, such 
as memory storage, communication overhead, energy consumption and the re-keying process. This 
mechanism relies upon the concepts of location-based routing [17]. Packets travel between nodes 
based on the information of the next repeater node. Subsequently, the static position of the sensor 
node encourages proposing a strategy for managing and controlling the transmission of secure 
packets between wireless nodes. In addition, maintaining network connectivity when removing or 
joining nodes makes it necessary to know the identification of the neighboring node/nodes in order 
to exchange the cryptographic keys and create a secure communication link. The main idea behind 
this work is to allow an ordinary node to determine its authenticated neighbor without the use of 
complex computations. Nodes will make their decision depending on the recommendation message 
from the node called the leader node (Ln). The Ln is located at a calculated distance from the line 
topology of ordinary nodes. Figure 1 illustrates the deployment of the nodes in our scheme and Table 
1 provides details on the notation used.  
 
Figure 1. Nodes in line topology. 
  
Figure 1. Nodes in line topology.
Sensors 2016, 16, 2204 5 of 19
Table 1. Explanation of notation used in Figure 1.
Symbol Description
ni, nj, nk, nl Ordinary nodes in the line topology
Ln Leader node
{ }k Symmetric encryption/decryption with key k
M Transmitted sensor data
ks Secret encryption source key
kni Secret encryption adjacent key of node i
ki Secret encryption individual key of node i
kLn Secret encryption leader node key
{{M}ks}kni Sensor data encrypted with source and adjacent keys
{M}ki Message encrypted with individual key of node i
{M}kLn Message encrypted with leader nod key
3.2. The Platform
The main focus of this work is a real time testbed implementation of a secure data routing
algorithm. A Waspmote platform created by Libelium (Zaragoza, Spain) as shown in Figure 2 was
used. The Waspmote sensor node is provided with different frequency radio and protocols as shown
in Table 2.
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Table 2. Modules integrated in Waspmote.
Module Protocol Frequency Tx_Power Sensitivity Range
be 802.14.5-pro 802.14.5 2.4 GHz 100 mW −100 dBm 700 m
XBee ZBee-Pro ZBee-Pro 2.4 G z 50 mW −102 dBm 7000 m
XBee 868 RF 868 HMz 315 mW −112 dBm 12 km
XBee 900 RF 900 MHz 50 mW −100 dBm 10 km
WiFi 802.11b/g 2.4 GHz 0–12 dBm −83 dBm 7000 m
GPRS - 8500/900/1800/1900 MHz 2W(Class 4) 859/900 MHz1W(Class 1) 1800/1900 Mhz −109 dBm
km typical
carrier range
3G/GPRS -
Tri-Band UMS
2100/1900/900 MHz
Quad-based GSM/EDGE,
850/900/1800/1900 MHz
−106 dBm km typicalcarrier range
Bluetooth Low
Energy
Bluetooth v.4.0/
Bluetooth Smart 2.4 GHz −103 dBm 100 m
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In the work presented here the XBee-Pro protocol is used for communications between nodes.
This provides for a maximum communication distance of 7000 m between nodes which is ideal for the
line topology used in this work.
3.3. Travelling Packets
As shown in Figure 1, the packet travels from the source to the destination based on the location
of the nodes in the neighboring node’s list of members, which is coordinated from/by the leader
node, Ln. Each ordinary node must forward the packet to its next authenticated neighbor through link
encryption with its adjacent key, ‘knj’. The fundamental motivation behind this strategy is to configure
a network line topology with simple and scalable security algorithms.
3.4. Packet Structure
Generally, a packet consists of two different parts, namely, the header field and the payload field.
The header part is a set of bytes that are usually used to determine packet characteristics, for instance,
Start Delimiter, Frame Type ‘Binary/ASCII’, Node ID and Frame Sequence. The frame payload part is
used to store sensor data. Figure 3 shows the ASCII frame structure of the Libelium Waspmote that is
used in this work. After applying the encryption function, the Waspmote Frame encrypted with the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key is specified as input. This encrypted information becomes
the payload of the new encapsulated frame as in Figure 4.
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Although, th maximum default frame size in the Waspmote is 150 bytes per frame, the frame
size depends on three characteristics:
• Encryption
• Type of XBee module used
• Transmission mode
Table 3 illustrates the maximum Waspm te frame size per protocol. The XBee 802.15.4 Link
Encr pted of 16 bit Unicast and Broadcast protocols are used in this work with maximum frame size
of 98 Bytes and 95 Bytes respectively (highlighted in Table 3).
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Table 3. Maximum frame size per protocol.
Module Maximum Frame Size
XBee-802.15.4
Link Encrypted
@16bit Unicast 98 Bytes
@64bit Unicast 94 Bytes
Broadcast 95 Bytes
Link Unencrypted 100 Bytes
XBee-868 100 Bytes
XBee-900
Link Encrypted 80 Bytes
Link Unencrypted 100 Bytes
XBee-Digimesh 73 Bytes
XBee-ZigBee
Link Encrypted @64bit Unicast 66 Bytes
Broadcast 84 Bytes
Link Unencrypted @64bit Unicast 74 Bytes
Broadcast 92 Bytes
Bluetooth-transparent connection Limited by MAX_FRAME
GPRS Limited by MAX_FRAME
3G Limited by MAX_FRAME
LoRa/SX1272 Limited by MAX_FRAME
WiFi Limited by MAX_FRAME
3.5. Security and Key Management
This section presents an overview of the services provided, such as confidentiality, availability
and localization, as well as a smart technique to transmit security data between sensor nodes
while addressing the issues of key management. The technique presented here uses a symmetric
cryptographic algorithm to encrypt the links between the ordinary nodes and the leader node.
The approach that was implemented for this work was based on the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) with a key length of 128 bits. Here AES encrypts a block of elements using the electronic
codebook (ECB) encryption mode as shown in Table 4.
Table 4. AES-128 with ECB cipher mode and zeros padding.
Algorithm Key Size Data Block Size Mode Cipher Padding
AES-128 128 bits 16 Bytes ECB ZEROS
3.5.1. Transmission Security and Data Encryption
As shown in Figure 5, sensor data, ‘M’, is encrypted in the application layer via software with AES
128 using the source key, ‘ks’, which is shared exclusively between the source and the destination nodes.
Then, the encrypted frame is encrypted again with the shared adjacent key, ‘kni’ (AES-128), which
is shared exclusively between every set of two neighbors as in Equation (1) below. The repeater node
that forwards the sensor data to the destination in the network will decrypt the information once using
the shared adjacent key, ‘kni’. Then, to ensure complete confidentiality and privacy, before forwarding
the data to the next repeater, the node will encrypt it via its adjacent key, ‘knj’. Thus, the repeater will
not be able to see the original sensor data transmitted due to the encryption with the source key, ‘ks’.
Equation (1) below shows this process where decryption with a shared adjacent key which is shared
with the neighbor of the node performing the encryption:
ni → nj :
{
{M}ks
}
kni
then at nj : :
{{
{M}ks
}
kni
}
kni
then nj → nk :
{
{M}ks
}
knj
etc . . . (1)
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3.5.2. Key Pre-Distribution
In this scheme, the initial process is offline, such as the establishment of the authenticated
neighbors list and the pre-distribution of keys. Each ordinary node has its own symmetric adjacent key.
This key is shared only with a trustworthy neighbor in the line network topology. All ordinary nodes
and the leader node must share a master key called the Leader node key, ‘kLn’. This key is used for all
confidential communications bet een network members in processes such as when a new member
joins the network, and for monitoring the behavior of the ordinary nodes. The individual key, ‘k j’, is a
unique pre-distributed key between every ordinary node and the leader node. This key is used in the
re-keying phase during the revocation process.
3.5.3. Re-Keying
In the case of a network member being revoked, only the leader node key, ‘kLn’, and one adjacent
key needs to be renewed. Subsequently, every node in the network has a key re-generation mechanism
to create a new key. This mechanism relies upon the Message Digest 5 algorithm (MD5) outlined in
Table 5 and a hash of the Real Time Clock (RTC) value as shown below:
kni = H(RTC) (2)
Table 5. MD5 hash algorithm.
Algorithm Output Size(Bits)
Internal State Size
(Bits)
Block Size
(Bits)
Max Message Size
(Bits)
Word Size
(Bit)
MD5 128 128 512 264 − 1 32
Due to the straight line network topology, only the node located before the revoked node must
update its own adjacent key, ‘knj’. This node then needs to share its new key with the new neighbor
that replaces the revoked node in the authenticated neighbors list. This stage is coordinated by the Ln
via a method of unicasting a revoked message that is encrypted with a pre-distributed individual key,
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‘k j’. The revoked message contains elements such as the revoked node ID, the new neighbor ID and
the new leader node key. {
New_KLn, IDj, IDk, STAMPI I
}
Ki (3)
where ‘New_KLn’ is the new leader node key, ‘IDj’ and ‘IDk’ are the identification numbers of the
revoked node and the new authenticated neighbor respectively and the ‘STAMPI I ’ part, which indicates
the order of the elements in the revoked message as well as the length and hash of ‘New_KLn’. The next
step after receiving the revoked message is that the node will update its adjacent key, ‘New_knj’, using
its key re-generation mechanism and it shares this key with its authenticated new neighbor node:{
NewKnj
}
NewKLN
(4)
The authentication process between new neighbors is coordinated by the leader node, as shown
in Figure 6. Initially, the Ln will send the authentication message of the new neighbor to the node that
is located after the revoked node in the network topology. This message contains the new neighbor
ID, the new leader node key and the ‘STAMPI ’ part, which indicates the order of the elements in the
message as well as the length and hash of ‘New_KLn’. Then, the new neighbors will establish a secured
encrypted link:
{New_KLn, IDi, STAMPI}Kk (5)Sensors 2016, 16, 2204 9 of 19 
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3.5.4. Memory Requirement
One of the major challenges in the establishment of a high security system in WSN is the limitation
of memory capacity and storage. The constructed scheme occupies only a small memory size and
this makes it suitable due to the limited storage capacity in sensor nodes. The binary sketch size
of the uploaded program and the bootloader program stored in the Flash memory is 57,230 ytes
of a maximum of 122,888 bytes available, and 4987 bytes of chip memory SRAM of a aximum of
8192 bytes available.
Figure 7 shows the key administration operation in our scheme. If the leader node revokes any
node member from the network, the key update phase will be performed by two of the revoked node
neighbors in the line topology.
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4. Practical Implementation of Proposed Framework
In this section, we present the implementation and test measurements of the scheme.
The implementation involves four Waspmote nodes, a Waspmote Gateway, four XBee 802.15.4 Pro
modules with antennae (Figure 8), a MC1322x USB ZigBee dongle, an Agilent 66321D Mobile
communication DC Source, a Waspmote Pro IDE version 04 with Waspmote Pro API Version 013
software based on Arduino, X-CTU provided by Digi and the Wireshark network analyzer.Sensors 2016, 16, 2204 10 of 19 
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Figure 8. Waspmote platform integrated with XBee-pro module.
Below is an outline of the three scenarios used to provide measurements to obtain the optimum
configuration. The three scenarios were:
(1) Four nodes and the gateway at a distance of 80, 120 or 160 m between end points in line topology.
(2) Three nodes and the gateway at a distance of 80, 120 or 160 m between end points in the
line topology.
(3) One repea er node between sender and the gateway at a distance of 80, 120 or 160 m between
end points in the line topology.
Figure 9 shows the physical setup of the scheme, where each Waspmote was placed on a fixed
pole at a height of 80 cm from the ground. The effects of temperature and humidity on RSSI in WSNs
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as in [18] was considered. In this scenario the temperature was between 20 ◦C and 21 ◦C and the
humidity was 70%.
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Figure 9. System outdoor deployment.
4.1. Received Single Strength Indicator Measurement
In order to ascertain the received single strength indicator (RSSI) a test involving the transmission
of a fixed amount of data was performed. In this experiment, the received single strength indicator
(RSSI) was measured at the gateway. Figure 10 depicts the average value of RSSI which was measured
after receiving 300 encrypted packets of 79 bytes in size at a baud rate of 115,200 bps.
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These values were measured in the three aforementioned scenarios of distances and repeaters.
The signal strength in the 80 m scenario was the strongest in the all case of one, two and three
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repeaters at exactly −48, −41 and −36 dB respectively. However, in the case of one repeater the 160 m
scenario had the minimum signal strength value at −64 dB. While, in the case of all possible scenarios
(as mentioned in Section 3) the maximum achievable signal strength is −36 dB, which is the 80 m
distance with three repeaters scenario. These measurements are used by the leader node to determine
the positions of future new joining nodes into the line topology.
4.2. Round Time Trip Measurement
Figure 11 illustrates the average round time trip (RTT) for the different numbers of repeaters
when increasing the distances between the sender and the gateway. In this experiment, RTT represents
the elapsed time between the sender and the returned acknowledgment of the gateway to the last
repeater. In fact, there was not a big difference in RTT measurements in the cases of one and two
repeaters in all scenarios. However, in the three repeaters case, the time delay between 80 m and 160 m
scenarios increased by approximately 39.248 ms, where RTT only increased by approximately 1.772 ms
in the two repeaters case. The best RTT was obtained for the 80 m separation distance in all scenarios
at 968.73, 1037.4 and 1996.802 ms in the one, two, and three repeater cases, respectively. These results
were captured using a MC1322x USB Zigbee Dongle and the Wireshark network analyzer.Sensors 2016, 16, 2204 12 of 19 
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4.3. Current Consumption
Data processing relies on the size of the data and the approach used in processing this data.
Further ore, the designed sche e has been adapted to use ini u current consu ption for data
processing. Figure 12 illustrates the average current consu ption of the fully functional sche e
including the XBee transmission module current consumption. However, the current consumption of
the transmission data has been improved by using sleeping schedules for the receiving/transmitting
modules (the XBee current consumption is from 37 to 64 mA with the mode ON fully operational).
The measurements were taken using the 66321D-Agilent with input 3.689 V and 0.19999 Ω resistance.
The average current consumption of the XBee module is 64.9123 mA when the leader node is
fully operational, this was significantly improved by introducing the sleeping mode feature as
described below.
The XBee module in the leader node will return to sleeping mode after transmitting/receiving
data. Figure 13 shows the average current consumption of the sleeping mode of the XBee
modules in the scheme. Where this is the total current consumption during data processing except
for the transmission/receiving phase. The measured current consumption has been improved
from 64.9123 to 7.4355 mA, which is a reduction of over 88%. Table 6 provides the current consumption
of the scheme modes, this includes when the XBee module is fully functional and sleeping.
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Table 6. Measured current consumption of scheme modes.
Scheme Mode
Measured Current Consumption (mA)
Max Min Average
Fully functional system 66.732 63.5297 64.9123
XBee module (sleeping) 9.4567 5.6248 7.4355
XBee module current consumption (awake) 57.2753 57.9049 57.4768
5. Discussion and Comparisons
In [19] Piyare et al. evaluated the performance of ZigBee networks based on XBee modules in
terms of RSSI. The experiment was based on the single-hop and multi-hop in line network topology.
In this experiment, average values of the RSSI was measured after transmitting 50 packets of 30 Bytes
with varied distance between the sender and the receiver. Figure 14 illustrates the relationship between
the measured RSSI and the distance using two different transmit power values of −2 dBm and 2 dBm.
In our scheme, the measurements have been taken after transmitting 300 encrypted packets of 97 Bytes
in an outdoor environment. As shown in Figure 14, the three measured values of RSSI decreased when
the distance between the sender and the receiver was increased. However, our scheme presents strong
signal strength values at all distance scenarios, where the strongest value is −36 dBm at 20 m and the
weakest value was −43 dBm at 40 m. In the 20 and 30 m distances, the fluctuation in this scheme is
graphed and can be correlated with interference from other networks, e.g., reflection phenomena.
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Figure 14. Proposed scheme measured RSSI values with different distances versus the
Piyare [19] results.
When comparing the work undertaken, it was compared to Jorg and Guangyu [12]. Figure 15
presents their result of the average Round Trip Time RTT of line network topology. The experimental
setup consisted of multiple different scenarios of distance and number of repeaters. Initially,
the scenarios were: 9.14 m (30 feet), 18.288 m (60 feet), and 27.432 m (90 feet) between nodes, with one
hop, two hops, three hops, four hops, and five hop scenarios (one hop per repeater). Furthermore,
Figure 16 depicts the three scenarios of our scheme, which are one repeater, two repeaters, and three
repeaters in 80, 120 and 160 m distances between the sender and the gateway.
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In the cases of 40 and 60 m distances between the nodes in the single repeater scenario,
both schemes presented approximately the same time delay. However, in the two repeaters scenario,
at a distance of 55 m the setup showed a time delay of 1033.172 ms and [12] presents approximately
1300 ms. In addition, the time delay between our scheme and [12] was around 170 ms in the same
scenario at the distance of 27 m. Comparatively, travelling packets in the scheme being presented
needed larger delays in comparison with [12] at distance of 40 m in the case of the three repeaters
scenario. Generally, the time of receiving transmitting packets increase with the number of repeaters.
In Tables 7 and 8, a comprehensive comparison between the scheme presented and three other
schemes in terms of cryptographic scheme, size and number of stored security keys, memory space
used by schemes, maintenance and re-keying strategy, scheme implementation environment, nodes and
coordination, is shown.
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Table 7. Comparison between schemes.
Scheme Offline Phase CryptographicScheme Key Size (bits)
Communication
Type Number of Storage Keys
Memory Space
Used by the
Scheme
Re-Keying Strategy
Neighborhood
Scheme [12]
Certificate stored
in each node
Hybrid
(RSA and symmetric) 128 Multicast/Unicast
Each node stores: own
public/private keys; own secret
neighborhood key; neighbors secret
key(s), and source key (used when
the node is data source)
Not Given
Local operation, where each
node updates keys with its
current neighbor.
Hierarchical Key
Management
Scheme [13]
No pre-loaded
keys
Hybrid
(D–H and Symmetric) Not Given
Broadcast (2-hop
adjacent node)
• Level 1 head stores its secret key
and secret key of Level 2 head.
• Level 2 head stores its secret key
and secret key of Level 1 head.
• Ordinary node stores the secret
key of the Level 2 head, secret
communication key, and
DH keys.
Not Given
Complicated operation
where each level head node
must regenerate a number
of keys.
Time-Based Key
Management
Scheme [15]
Keys pre-loaded Symmetric 64 Broadcast
• 500 keys in center node.
• 100 keys for sensor nodes
(to ensure sharing of a key with
at least one of 10 neighbors)
• 4 KB for
center node
• 0.8 KB for
sensor node
Only the nodes deployed at
the same time when
compromised node is
revoked have to
regenerate keys.
Presented Scheme Keys pre-loaded
Symmetric AES-128 in
ECB mode with zeros
padding. Key
generation -MD5
and RTC.
128 Unicast
(5 keys) Each ordinary node stores;
own adjacent key; neighbor shared
adjacent key; an individual key that
is shared with leader node; Leader
node master key, and a source key
(used when the node is data source).
Program size
57,230 bytes Ram
required
4987 bytes.
Re-keying in this scheme is
a local operation, where
only one node must update
its adjacent key, in addition
to the leader node key.
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Table 8. Comparison between schemes.
Scheme Implementation Environment Node Coordination Comments
Neighborhood Scheme [12] • Simulation using the Glomosim Simulator.• Used HP iPAQ 550 PDAs outdoors.
• Node authentication is performed
without coordination with
other nodes.
• Provides protection against attacks to the routing
protocol using X509, RSA and a sequence number.
• Rekeying is a local operation between the nodes that
share neighborhood keys with a revoked node.
• Provides forward and backward security.
• Does not rely on an online trusted third party.
Hierarchical Key
Management Scheme [13] Simulation only
• Level 1 head coordinates all Level 2
heads in its subgroup.
• Level 2 head coordinates all
ordinary heads in its subgroup.
• Uses a spanning tree topology in ad hoc networks.
• Provides the forward and backward security.
• Latency issues during the authentication process and
updating secret keys.
Time-Based Key
Management Scheme [15] Simulation only
• For additional node deployment a
centre node coordinates
the authentication.
• The scheme is not suitable for a large sensor network
because of key storage requirements.
• Offers protection against wormhole and
sinkhole attack.
• Provides forward and backward security.
Presented Scheme
• Waspmote nodes and Gateway, XBee 802.15.4 Pro
module with antenna. MC1322x USB ZigBee
dongle. Agilent 66321D Mobile DC Source.
• Waspmote Pro IDE v04 with Pro API v013
software based on Arduino. X-CTU provided by
Digi and the Wireshark network analyzer in an
outdoor implementation.
• The Leader node monitors the
behaviour of all ordinary nodes in
this scheme.
• It is responsible for the
authentication, revocation, and
reconfiguration phases of
other nodes.
• Provides protection against attacks to the routing
protocol using location based routing.
• Node addition or revocation is handled by the
Leader Node.
• Rekeying is a local operation between the nodes that
share neighborhood keys with a revoked node.
• Provides forward and backward security.
• Does not rely on online trusted third party.
• All message exchanges are acknowledged.
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6. Conclusions
This paper presents an analysis of the security performance of a WSN running a symmetric
encryption security scheme that is suitable for use in a maritime coastal environment. The work made
the re-keying process a local operation and minimized the use of key memory storage. The technique
was implemented on the Waspmote platform and analyzed in terms of a received single strength
indicator (RSSI), average round time trip (RTT), and current consumption. These measurements were
taken in real time at the University of Limerick campus. The scheme implemented has improved some
common security issues in WSNs, including:
• Efficiency: 88.55% of current consumption was reduced using the XBee sleeping mode. This will
improve the lifetime of all network sensor nodes.
• Data confidentiality: by doubling the encryption of the messages, we ensure that only the gateway in
the network can decrypt the original data (using AES 128) and after that, we establish Peer-to-Peer
encryption between repeaters.
• Authentication: each node has an individual key shared with the leader node, which is used to
‘sign’ the messages in order to ensure the authenticity of the new neighbor and the rekeying.
This signing is performed when the leader node reconfigures the network topology in the case of
joining or revoking network members.
• Memory capacity storage: by using the re-generation function, there is no need for each node to
store as many keys as are required in some key pre-distribution schemes where a large pool of
keys is located in each node before deployment [20]. In our scheme, each node has only four keys.
Therefore, every node requires only a small amount of memory for key storage, which is four
times 128 bits.
• Non-repudiation: by signing the XBee acknowledgment messages, there is now verifiable proof
that the information sent has really been received by a specific sensor node. This signing using a
shared source/destination key, Ks, provides weak non-repudiation as a public key scheme is not
yet available in our system.
• Forward security: in the reconfiguration of the scheme, new neighbors could not communicate
directly before authentication process. The authentication process coordinates via a leader node.
• Backward security: when a node is revoked from the network, the system ensures that the node
cannot receive any new data from the network.
This work is progressing at our center and the current focus of the work is to facilitate the
implementation of an efficient public key scheme for use in the protocol. The availability of an efficient
public key scheme will enable the generation of digital signatures, provide strong non-repudiation
and will further enhance key distribution for use in a line topology network [21–24].
Acknowledgments: This work was part supported by the SFI Centre for Marine Renewable Energy Ireland
(MaREI). Grant References: 12/RC/2302 and 14/SP/2740.
Author Contributions: The proposed implementation was conceived and designed by Walid Elgenaidi, the main
author of this article. Thomas Newe was the authors PhD supervisor and mentor. Eoin O’Connell as joint PhD
supervisor contributed in the implementation and testing process. Daniel Toal is director of the MMRRC centre
where this work was conducted with the assistance of Gerard Dooly, senior research fellow in the MMRRC.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Mathur, A.; Newe, T.; Rao, M. Healthcare WSN: Cluster Elections and Selective Forwarding Defense.
In Proceedings of the 9th IEEE International Conference on Next Generation Mobile Applications, Services
and Technologies, Cambridge, UK, 9–11 September 2015; pp. 341–346.
2. Elgenaidi, W.; Newe, T. Marine based Wireless Sensor Networks: Challenges and Requirements.
In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Sensing Technology (ICST), Liverpool, UK,
1–4 September 2014.
Sensors 2016, 16, 2204 19 of 19
3. Gura, N.; Patel, A.; Wander, A.; Eberleand, H.; Shantz, S.C. Comparing Elliptic Curve Cryptography and RSA
on 8-bit CPUs. In Proceedings of the Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES), Cambridge,
MA, USA, 11–13 August 2004; pp. 119–132.
4. Perrig, A.; Szewczyk, R.; Wen, V.; Culler, D.; Tygar, J.D. SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks.
Wirel. Netw. 2002, 8, 521–534. [CrossRef]
5. Eschenauer, L.; Gligor, V. A key management scheme for distributed sensor networks. In Proceedings
of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security (CCS), Washington, DC, USA,
18–22 November 2002; pp. 41–47.
6. Chan, A.P.H.; Song, D. Random key per-distribution schemes for sensor networks. In Proceedings of the
2003 Symposium on Security and Privacy, Berkeley, CA, USA, 11–14 May 2003; pp. 42–51.
7. Kabara, J.; Calle, M. MAC Protocols Used by Wireless Sensor Networks and a General Method of Performance
Evaluation. Int. J. Distrib. Sens. Netw. 2012, 2012, 834784. [CrossRef]
8. Cuomo, F.; Della Luna, S.; Monaco, U.; Melodia, F. Routing in ZigBee: Benefits from Exploiting the IEEE
802.15.4 Association Tree. In Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE International Conference on Communications,
Glasgow, UK, 24–28 June 2007; pp. 3271–3276.
9. Wheeler, A. Commercial Applications of Wireless Sensor Networks Using ZigBee. IEEE Commun. Mag. 2007,
45, 70–77. [CrossRef]
10. Raazi, S.M.K.R.; Lee, S. A survey on key management strategies for different applications of wireless sensor
networks. J. Comput. Sci. Eng. 2010, 4, 23–51. [CrossRef]
11. Liu, A.; Dong, M.; Ota, K.; Long, J. PHACK: An Efficient Scheme for Selective Forwarding Attack Detecting
in WSNs. Sensors 2015, 15, 30942–30963. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
12. Liebeherr, J.; Dong, G. An overlay approach to data security in ad-hoc networks. Ad Hoc Netw. 2006,
5, 1055–1072. [CrossRef]
13. Wang, V.; Fang, S. A hierarchical key management scheme for secure group communications in mobile ad
hoc networks. J. Syst. Softw. 2007, 80, 1667–1677. [CrossRef]
14. Annadurai, P. Trust Based Hierarchical Key Management Scheme for Secure Group Communication in
mobile Ad hoc networks. Int. J. Comput. Sci. Appl. 2008, 1, 974–1003.
15. Jang, J.; Kwon, T.; Song, J. A Time-Based Key Management Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks.
In Information Security Practice and Experience; Springer: Heidelberg, Germany, 2007.
16. Zhang, R.; Zhao, H.; Labrador, M.A. A Scalable and Energy Efficient Sink Location Service for Large-scale
Wireless Sensor Networks. Ad Hoc Sens. Wirel. Netw. 2007, 4, 289–320.
17. Luo, H.; Ye, F.; Cheng, J.; Lu, S.; Zhang, L. TTDD: A Two-tier Data Dissemination Model for Large-Scale
Wireless Sensor Networks. J. Wirel. Sens. Netw. 2005, 11, 161–175. [CrossRef]
18. Luomal, J.; Hakala, I. Effective of Temperature and Humidity on radio Signal strength in outdoor Wireless
Sensor Network. In Proceedings of the Federated Conference on Computer Sceince and Information Systems,
Lodz, Poland, 13–16 September 2015; pp. 1257–1265.
19. Rajeev, P.; Seong, L. Performance Analysis of XBee ZB Module Based Wireless Sensor Networks.
Int. J. Sci. Eng. 2013, 4, 1615–1621.
20. Möller, S.; Newe, T.; Lochmann, S. Evaluation of Key Distribution Protocols for use with Wireless Sensor
Networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Sensors Applications Symposium (IEEE SAS 2009), New Orleans, LA,
USA, 17–19 February 2009; pp. 25–28.
21. Boyle, D.E.; Newe, T. On the implementation and evaluation of an elliptic curve based cryptosystem for Java
enabled Wireless Sensor Networks. Sens. Actuators A Phys. 2009, 156, 394–405. [CrossRef]
22. Cionca, V.; Newe, T.; Dãdârlat, V. Configuration Tool for a Wireless Sensor Network Integrated Security
Framework. J. Net. Syst. Manag. 2012, 20, 417–452. [CrossRef]
23. Möller, S.; Newe, T.; Lochmann, S. Prototype of a secure wireless patient monitoring system for the medical
community. Sens. Actuators A Phys. 2012, 173, 55–65. [CrossRef]
24. Healy, M.; Newe, T.; Lewis, E. Security for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Review. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Sensors Applications Symposium (IEEE SAS 2009), New Orleans, LA, USA, 17–19 February 2009; pp. 80–85.
© 2016 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC-BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
